Strategy & international cooperation
Prisoner’s Dilemma, tit-for-tat, neoliberal institutionalism & neorealism
The Next Move
When does hiding a site pay?
Send Vela’s inspection order, then rewind the first or last meeting to see tit-for-tat at work. Decide whether to sign two draft agreements and explain why cooperation and the balance of power can pull in different directions. Then test a tariff fine and apply your reasoning to a historical treaty.
Choose For Class at the start. Enter your name and, if you wish, your class or section. Finish the responses and checks to open your report.
Choose Download Class PDF in your finished report. If needed, use Print or save as PDF. Open the PDF to check your name and responses, then upload it to Canvas.
To pause or change devices, open Save & resume and download a JSON backup. Use the same activity and mode to restore it.
What you can explore
- Compare a country’s two payoffs with its rival’s choice held fixed.
- Compare a first and last breach to explain when a short-run gain costs points later.
- Use the draft comparison to explain how institutions help sustain cooperation and why a rival’s relative gains can still matter.
- Test how a trade penalty changes a best reply and what could make a treaty rule matter.
- Distinguish a Prisoner’s Dilemma from a coordination problem in a fresh case.
Guides & downloads
What the model leaves open
The states, crises and point values are fictional. Orin uses an announced copying rule in the repeated game. The treaty provisions describe legal rules. Historical behavior requires separate evidence.
AFTERWARD, THINK ABOUT
What did Vela gain immediately by hiding first? When could Orin respond? What changes when Vela hides last?
Teaching this activity Debrief, assessment & assignment draft
Bring it back to the room
- What did Vela gain immediately by hiding first? When could Orin respond? What changes when Vela hides last?
- Both drafts keep the same inspections and future meetings. What makes Draft B a different security decision for Vela?
- Why does a three-point fine make mutual compliance stable? How can mutual breach also be stable?
- Which record could help you test your treaty explanation? What finding would weaken it?
- How do the two possible radio choices show whether there is a dominant strategy?
What to assess
Look for both payoff comparisons, the timing of Orin’s response, and an explanation of verification and relative gains grounded in the student’s draft decisions. Check the treaty claim and evidence and the best reply to each radio choice.
Read the complete teaching guide →Syllabus description, rubric & printable companion →
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Syllabus description & discussion prompts
Syllabus description
Send Vela’s inspection order, then rewind the first or last meeting to see tit-for-tat at work. Decide whether to sign two draft agreements and explain why cooperation and the balance of power can pull in different directions. Then test a tariff fine and apply your reasoning to a historical treaty. Students produce a class report with a replay log, both draft decisions, a theory explanation, cabinet advice, a treaty analysis, and a rescue radio check.
Questions for a discussion board or class debrief
- What did Vela gain immediately by hiding first? When could Orin respond? What changes when Vela hides last?
- Both drafts keep the same inspections and future meetings. What makes Draft B a different security decision for Vela?
- Why does a three-point fine make mutual compliance stable? How can mutual breach also be stable?
- Which record could help you test your treaty explanation? What finding would weaken it?
- How do the two possible radio choices show whether there is a dominant strategy?